For, in general, the express introduction of certain particular exceptions, raises a presumption, that no others were intended. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, is a reasonable & established rule of construction. But it seems equally extraordinary, on the other hand, (upon the supposition, that the power of devising was intended to be given to Penns court), that they were not expressly named in the acts; especially when it is considered, that their disabilities, at common law, are such, as I have before stated — and still more especially, as the statute in question was made long after it had been solemnly & solemnly settled, both by judicial & parliamentary authority, that the words, "all & every person & persons," in the English statute of devises, did not include Penns court. For in all such cases, it is a reasonable presumption, that the legislature, by whom a later statute is made, intended to adopt the settled & known construction, given to their own words, or to words of precisely the same import, in an older statute. — The question, upon the act of Massachusetts, appears to me, upon the whole, not free from perplexity. The only difficulty, in my mind, arises from the express exception of infants &c, and the silence of the statutes as to Penns court. But, as the power of devising is, in my judgment,